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Norwegian Whaling and the Pelly Amendment: A
Misguided Attempt at Conservation
Clay Erik Hawes
The debate over the desirability of hunting whales has been
raging for several decades.' During the 1960s, the United
States, in conjunction with the growth of public environmental
awareness, became a strong leader in the fight to end whaling.2
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the cry "Save the Whales!"
echoed throughout the world,3 and the number of whales killed
each year decreased steadily.4 However, nations such as Nor-
way and Japan have long national traditions of whaling5 and
are not willing to simply capitulate and allow whale hunting to
become a thing of the past.6 Indeed, Norway has recently re-
1. One commentator describes the debate as "based on two views of the
whales: (1) the conservationists, who view the whales from a... utilitarian
point of view, and (2) the protectionists, who view the slaughter as a violation of
the natural right of life itself." Luis Kutner, The Genocide of Whales: A Crime
Against Humanity, reprinted in Outlaw Whaling: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 129,
136 (1979).
2. Id.
3. In the words of The Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) and
the Earth Island Institute (ElI), "'Save the whales' became a rallying cry that
accompanied the birth of the modern environmental movement." CoMMERcIAL
WHALING INFORMATION KIT (HSUS, Gaithersburg, Md., & ElI, San Francisco,
Cal.).
4. For example, in 1966, the alarmingly decimated populations of the blue
whale and the humpback whale became completely protected from all whaling.
William Graves, The Imperiled Giants, 150 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 722, 724 (Dec.
1976).
5. See infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
6. In discussing the effect of privately organized boycotts and the looming
threat of possible U.S. trade sanctions, the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs has told the Norwegian Parliament that "[wie are not prepared to give way
to campaigns and sanctions." Johan Jorgen Holst, Statement to the Storting
(May 18, 1993) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade) [hereinaf-
ter Holst Statement]. Japan has even indicated that there is growing pressure
in the Japanese Parliament for Japan to withdraw from the International
Whaling Commission, the chief regulatory body in the area of global whaling
practices. COMMERCIAL WHALING INFORMATION KIT, supra note 3.
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sumed limited commercial minke whaling operations. 7 Thus,
the whaling issue is far from settled.8
The whaling issue is currently at the forefront of the trade
and environment debate 9 as a result of Norway's recent decision
to resume commercial whaling and the U.S. response to that de-
cision. 10 Specifically, pursuant to the Pelly Amendment to the
Fishermen's Protective Act," the United States has threatened
to impose an embargo on certain Norwegian goods if Norway
does not cease its whaling operations. The current conflict over
whaling and the threat of a U.S. embargo against Norway pro-
vide a backdrop against which to evaluate the desirability of
unilateral sanctions as a way to achieve environmental
protection.
This Note examines whether the imposition of unilateral
U.S. trade sanctions against Norway would be an appropriate
response to Norway's recent resumption of commercial whaling.
Part I outlines the history of whaling and the development of
international efforts to preserve whale populations. Part II de-
tails U.S. legislation that attempts to enforce international
whale conservation programs by imposing unilateral sanctions.
Part III discusses the current controversy over Norway's re-
sumption of limited commercial whaling, and identifies the ma-
jor arguments on both sides of the debate. The arguments range
from scientific justifications for the permissibility of limited
7. See infra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
8. Rather than giving in, Norway and Japan are stepping up their efforts
to end the global ban on whaling. Japan, for example, has recently launched a
massive publicity campaign in an effort to sway public opinion towards the side
of the pro-whaling nations. Japan to Press for Resumption of Commercial
Whaling, European Report, Feb. 13, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Allnws File.
9. The conflict which has recently developed between free trade and envi-
ronmental protection appears to have been inevitable. The immediate objec-
tives of trade policies and environmental policies often are diametrically
opposed. For example, "free trade supporters fear that environmental regula-
tions will be used as a facade to conceal discriminatory or protectionist trade
agendas, while environmentalists argue that nations are escaping their duty to
protect the environment by relying on free trade provisions embodied in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)." Janet McDonald, Greening
the GATT: Harmonizing Free Trade and Environmental Protection in the New
World Order, 23 ENvTL. L. 397, 399 (1992). Despite this conflict, both types of
policies must be protected and encouraged because "both values are essential to
our future survival and well-being." Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Free Trade and
Protection of the Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict?, 86 Am. J. INVL L. 700,
703 (1992).
10. See infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
11. 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (Supp. II 1990).
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whaling practices to emotional appeals for strong conservation
measures.
Part IV analyzes the potential U.S. ban of certain Norwe-
gian imports under the Pelly Amendment in the context of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),'12 and con-
cludes that such sanctions would constitute an unjustifiable
quantitative restriction. Part V analyzes the whaling debate in
a broader, policy context. The Note concludes that unilateral
trade measures to protect the environment, while generally un-
desirable, are especially inappropriate in the whaling context
because there is no scientific justification for the proposed
measures.
I. THE HISTORY OF WHALING AND CONSERVATION
Whaling has not always been the subject of international
controversy. Indeed, whaling was recognized for hundreds of
years as a valuable and necessary industry in many parts of the
world. 13 Ironically, the widespread popularity of whaling led to
the chronic overfishing that endangered the very existence of
many species of whales. 14 The volatile history of whaling pro-
vides a compelling example of the struggle between the allure of
a lucrative industry and the need to conserve the limited natural
resource which supports that industry.
A. EARLY HISTORY
Humans have been hunting whales for thousands of
years. 15 For early humans, whales were highly valued for the
resources they contained. One whale yielded not only a large
amount of food, but also oil, clothing, tools, and weapons. 16
Although humans often revered whales as "companions of the
gods," 17 the practical benefits that whales provided eventually
12. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATI].
13. "Even today a measure of the wealth and power of the whaling captains
endures in the elegant homes many of them built for themselves in the major
ports of the fishery - Nantucket, Fairhaven, New London, Sag Harbor, and...
New Bedford." Graves, supra note 4, at 730.
14. See, e.g., infra note 95 and accompanying text.
15. Some sources indicate that whaling began as early as 4,000 years ago.
Graves, supra note 4, at 725. Other sources mention cave paintings which de-
pict whaling methods and argue that prehistoric whaling began in the Neolithic
period, over 8,000 years ago. JEAN-PIERRE PRouLx, WHALING IN THE NORTH AT-
LANTIC: FROM EARuIEST Tmms To THE Mm-19"m CENTURY 7 (1986).
16. PRouLx, supra note 15, at 7.
17. Graves, supra note 4, at 725.
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led prehistoric hunters to take to the open sea in pursuit of these
mighty creatures.' 8
As time wore on, whaling techniques grew more sophisti-
cated and whale populations began to decline.19 The Basques
began the first organized whaling operation approximately 800
years ago and succeeded in almost eliminating an entire species
known as the Biscayan right whale.20 Near-extinction was to
become a familiar occurrence in the whaling industry.21
By the mid-1800s, severe overfishing had nearly destroyed
the whaling industry.22 By 1860, however, the quickening pace
of technology rejuvenated the sagging industry. 23 The innova-
tion of the steamship, for example, found its way into the indus-
try, making sailing ships a thing of the past.24 More
importantly, in the late 1860s, the Norwegian sailor Svend Foyn
developed an effective harpoon gun 25 and, suddenly, whaling
was booming again.26 In the words of whaling experts, "[wlith
the appearance on the scene of the Norwegians in the 1860s, the
modern history of whaling begins."27
B. EVOLUTION OF CONSERVATION EFFORTS AND THE
INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION
The dramatic rise and fall of whale stocks has always
plagued the whaling industry. 28 Despite this recurring problem
and the overall decline in whale stocks brought on by more effi-
18. PRouLx, supra note 15, at 7.
19. Kutner, supra note 1, at 134.
20. Graves, supra note 4, at 725.
21. Kutner, supra note 1, at 133.
22. Graves, supra note 4, at 732. The discovery, in 1859, of petroleum as a
cheap substitute for whale oil also threatened the health of the industry. Id.
23. See id.
24. The year 1861 proved to be "the death-blow to sailing vessels." J.T.
JENKINs, A Hisroy OF THE WHALE FISHERIES 257 (1921).
25. Though harpoon guns had been developed somewhat earlier, Foyn's
was a marked improvement in that it had a range of nearly fifty yards. Id. at
264.
26. Foyn's personal efforts to revitalize the industry should not be over-
looked. In the words of one early twentieth century fisheries expert, "[wihaling
appeared to be dying out completely" prior to the introduction of Foyn's im-
proved harpoon gun. Id. "Svend Foyn's personal contribution was decisive" in
revolutionizing the whaling industry. J.N. TONNESSEN & A.O. JOHNSEN, THE
HISTORY OF MODERN WHALING 14 (R.I. Christophersen trans., 1982).
27. PROULX, supra note 15, at 77.
28. "Throughout its exploitation of the whales, the whaling industry has
utilized a 'boom-bust' method of exploitation. After one species of whale is
hunted to the point of 'commercial extinction', another species is sought in its
place." Kutner, supra note 1, at 134.
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cient whaling methods, the international community paid little
attention to whale conservation or to the regulation of whaling
until the twentieth century.29 Leading scientists finally began
to recognize the need for some form of regulation in the 1920s.
In 1921, for example, Dr. J.T. Jenkins, a noted English fishery
superintendent, wrote that "[t]here can be little doubt that in
the future whaling all over the world should be the subject of
suitable regulation, having for its main object the protection of
the few remaining Cetacea."30
Despite this recognition, the whaling industry continued to
expand throughout the 1920s.3 1 One of the foremost causes of
this expansion was the beginning of pelagic whaling by Japan,
Germany and the Soviet Union.3 2 Pelagic whaling involves the
use of huge floating whaling "factories."33 The practice is partic-
ularly conducive to overfishing, and is now strictly forbidden
under international law.3 4
Concerned about the future of the industry, whaling compa-
nies eventually made an attempt at self-regulation in the early
1930s.35 Though ineffective,3 6 the mere attempt indicated that
the days of unrestricted whaling had passed.37 Finally, at the
1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling
(ICRW),38 the major whaling nations of the world established
29. Id. at 135.
30. JENKINS, supra note 24, at 57.
31. TONNESSEN & JOHNSEN, supra note 26, at 367.
32. See id. at 414-32.
33. In a pelagic whaling operation, the whales are actually caught by
small, swift "catcher boats." These boats deliver their catches to the factory
ships, where the whales are thoroughly processed before being stored for the
fleet's return home. Kutner, supra note 1, at 138.
34. The International Whaling Commission, discussed infra text accompa-
nying notes 39-45, presently forbids pelagic whaling. This is one of the few IWC
rules which is not the subject of debate. Norway itself states that "[tihis form of
whaling has been halted once and for all, and Norway has no desire to resume
industrial whaling." Norwegian minke whaling: Coastal livelihood and natu-
ral resource management, NORWAY INFORMATION (Norwegian Ministry of For-
eign Affairs), Mar. 1993, at 1 [hereinafter Norwegian minke whaling].
35. This attempt followed the 1931 Whaling Convention. The Convention,
under the auspices of the League of Nations, was a rather feeble effort at an
international conservation program. Kutner, supra note 1, at 135.
36. Id.
37. The self-regulation scheme of the early 1930's was followed by a series
of bilateral production agreements between Norway and Great Britain, the two
chief whaling powers of the time. See ToNNESSEN & JOHNSEN, supra note 26, at
436-42.
38. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, opened for sig-
nature Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 [hereinafter ICRW].
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the International Whaling Commission (IWC)39 and ushered in
the era of "quota whaling."40
The IWC, as the world's preeminent organization on whal-
ing, is designed "to establish a system of international regula-
tion for the whale fisheries to ensure proper and effective
conservation and development of whale stocks ... "41 The chief
tool which the IWC has used in pursuit of this goal is a system of
catch limits, or quotas, on the annual harvest of each species of
whale.42 However, throughout its forty-seven year history, the
IWC has consistently received unfavorable reviews,43 primarily
because it is not particularly well-suited to accomplish its objec-
tives. The IWC has no enforcement power, and any government
which formally objects to an IWC rule is automatically exempt
from compliance with that rule.44 The IWC's inability to enforce
its rules and quotas has led the United States to develop its own
unilateral mechanisms designed to enforce IWC rules. 45
II. U.S. ANTI-WHALING LEGISLATION
Between the 1850s and the 1960s, the United States
evolved from the world's dominant whaling nation46 into the
most influential force in the fight to end whaling altogether.47
39. Id. art. III.
40. ToNNEssFN & JOHNsEN, supra note 26, at 499.
41. ICRW, supra note 38, pmbl.
42. In recent years, this quota system has taken the form of a total global
moratorium on commercial whaling. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
43. The IWC's record in regulating whaling has been described by some as
"dismal." Kutner, supra note 1, at 130. At an early-1980s meeting of the Con-
vention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), several coun-
tries attacked the IWC, "presenting voluminous and overwhelming evidence
that the sperm, fin and sei whales have been grossly mismanaged under the
IWC...." U.S. Whaling Policies/International Whaling Commission: Hearing
Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1981) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Craig Van Note,
Executive Vice President, Monitor Consortium).
44. ICRW, supra note 38, art. V.
45. The U.S. Congress has declared that the ICRW, as implemented by the
IWC, "is not providing adequate protection for whales. .. ." Dep't. of State
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1980 and 1981, Pub. L. 96-60, tit. IV, § 405, 93
Stat. 395, 403 (1979).
46. TONNESSEN & JoHNsEN, supra note 26, at 11.
47. Graves, supra note 4, at 732. Conservationist Christine Stevens attrib-
utes this change in attitude to increased knowledge about whales. Id. She
notes, "We were poor when we were whalers and, about whales, very ignorant
and narrow-minded.... [W]e know enough in 1976 to admire whales and to
fight for them against their persecutors." Id.
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During the 1960s and 1970s, the U.S. pro-whale position 48 de-
veloped hand-in-hand with the growth of environmental aware-
ness in the American public. 49 By 1976, the United States had
become what some observers considered "[t]he nation most
deeply committed to the preservation of whales . . .- o
The efforts which the United States has taken to protect
whales are indeed extensive. For over ten years, the United
States has pursued an absolute global moratorium on commer-
cial whaling, 5 ' and, in 1985, finally achieved its goal in the
IWC.52 Perhaps more importantly, the U.S. Congress has
passed several significant laws aimed at protecting marine
mammals and ensuring that the rules of the IWC are obeyed.53
Although the international legal status of some of these laws
has been the subject of dispute,54 the practical effect they have
had, and will continue to have, is undeniable.55
Outside of the IWC, which has little concrete regulatory au-
thority, the only effective legal provisions regulating interna-
tional whaling are contained in U.S. domestic law. U.S. law is
important to the international effort to regulate the whaling in-
dustry because the United States has a history of imposing uni-
lateral trade measures in the name of environmental
48. The anti-whaling legislation enacted by Congress during the 1970s
provides an excellent example of the general pro-whale sentiment that has de-
veloped in the United States. See infra notes 53-76 and accompanying text.
49. Kutner, supra note 1, at 136.
50. Graves, supra note 4, at 732.
51. Hearing, supra note 43, at 3 (statement of James Walsh, Acting Admin-
istrator, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Dep't of
Com.).
52. The IWC has had a moratorium in place since 1987 and recently af-
firmed this policy at their annual meeting. Whaling: IWC Committee Chair-
man's Resignation a Shout of Protest, Europe Environment, July 6, 1993,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File.
53. The three most significant U.S. statutes in this area are the Marine
Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1371-1385 (1993) [hereinafter MMPA],
the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation
and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2) (1993) [hereinafter Packwood-
Magnuson Amendment], and the Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen's Protec-
tive Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1992) [hereinafter Pelly Amendment]. For further
discussion of these statutes, see infra notes 58-76 and accompanying text.
54. The MMPA, for example, was recently found to violate GATT. GATT
Dispute Settlement Panel, United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30
I.L.M. 1594 (Aug. 16, 1991) [hereinafter Tuna IDolphin].
55. Speaking of the sanctions called for by the Pelly and Packwood-
Magnuson Amendments, the Administrator of the NOAA has said, "[in the
cases that we've gone to [the offending nations] in the first instance and said,
let me give you notice, we're about to apply this sanction, we find they change
their behavior." Hearing, supra note 43, at 6 (statement of James Walsh).
MiAw. J GLOBAL TRADE
protection.5 6 In addition, the United States has gradually be-
come a strong leader for the governments and organizations
dedicated to eliminating commercial whaling.5 7 For these rea-
sons, an examination of whaling regulation necessarily focuses
on U.S. environmental legislation.
One of the first U.S. laws affecting whales was the Marine
Mammal Protection Act (MMPA),58 passed in 1972. Heralded as
a milestone in the fight to protect whales, the MMPA provides,
inter alia, that it shall be a crime for any person to import into
the United States any marine mammal which was taken in vio-
lation of regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Inte-
rior.59 Although a GATT panel has declared that the MMPA
violates international trade law,60 the MMPA played a major
role in the reformation of the Mexican tuna fishing industry,
which had been killing excessive numbers of dolphins during the
1980s.61
Another important U.S. statute is the Packwood-Magnuson
Amendment to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Man-
agement Act.62 Passed in 1979, the Packwood-Magnuson
Amendment is designed to enforce the rules and quotas of the
IWC.63 The thrust of the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment is
that any foreign country that diminishes the effectiveness of the
ICRW is automatically subject to revocation of fishing privileges
56. A recent example of such a trade measure is the 1990 U.S. embargo of
Mexico's "dolphin killing" tuna. See Tuna/Dolphin, supra note 54.
57. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
58. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1371-85 (Supp. II 1990).
59. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1372(c), 1373, 1375.
60. Tuna/Dolphin, supra note 54. The panel report was never adopted by
GATT and, technically, such reports are only binding once they have been so
adopted. Schoenbaum, supra note 9, at 704. See infra notes 174-89 and accom-
panying text for further discussion of Tuna/Dolphin.
61. Despite the findings of the Tuna/Dolphin panel, the sanctions of the
MMPA, backed by the political clout of the United States, convinced Mexico to
present the United States with a plan for making its tuna industry more
"dolphin-friendly." Mexico Agrees to Defer Action on Complaint on U.S. Tuna
Embargo, Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) Sept. 18, 1991, available in LEXIS, BNA Li-
brary, Intrad File.
62. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2) (1988).
63. The enforcement provisions of the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment
are not triggered until the Secretary of State finds that a foreign nation is di-
minishing the effectiveness of the International Convention for the Regulation
of Whaling (ICRW). 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2)(i). Because the ICRW is made effec-
tive through the rules of the IWC, the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment is an
attempt by Congress to assist the IWC in obtaining compliance with its own
rules.
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in U.S. waters. 64 Although these sanctions are not as severe as
an import prohibition, the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment
has nevertheless been a highly effective tool for U.S. whale pro-
tection efforts. 65
The U.S. law which most extensively affects whaling is the
Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen's Protective Act.66 The
Pelly Amendment, passed in 1971 out of concern over high seas
salmon fishing,67 applies to all species of marine creatures that
are the subject of an "international fishery conservation pro-
gram."68 As a result, over the last twenty years the Pelly
Amendment has become an important part of the U.S. legisla-
tive anti-whaling arsenal and is at the center of the current de-
bate over Norwegian whaling practices.69
The Pelly Amendment provides that, upon a finding that a
foreign nation is diminishing the effectiveness 70 of an interna-
tional fishery conservation program, 71 the U.S. Secretary of
Commerce shall certify that fact to the President. 72 After certifi-
cation occurs, the President may direct the Secretary of the
Treasury to prohibit the importation of any fish products from
64. In terms of the statute, what is taken away are fishing "allocations"
which were initially granted to the foreign nation under the Magnuson Fishery
Conservation and Management Act. 16 U.S.C. § 1801 (Supp. II 1990). Once the
required finding of diminished effectiveness has been made, the Secretary of
State is required to reduce the allocations by at least 50 percent. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1821 (e)(2)(B)(ii). Further reductions may occur if the foreign nation does not
take steps towards compliance with IWC rules within the 365-day remedial pe-
riod. 16 U.S.C. § 1821 (e)(2)(D).
65. For example, in the mid-1980s, sanctions imposed pursuant to the
Packwood-Magnuson Amendment helped to bring about an end to whaling by
the Soviet Union. Gene S. Martin, Jr. & James W. Brennan, Enforcing the In-
ternational Convention for the Regulation of Whaling: The Pelly and Packwood-
Magnuson Amendments, 17 DENV. J. INTL L. & POL'Y 293, 301 (1989).
66. 22 U.S.C. § 1978.
67. Martin & Brennan, supra note 65, at 294.
68. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(1).
69. The Pelly Amendment is prominent in this situation since it is the only
law which the United States can use to exert pressure on Norway. The MMPA
cannot be invoked because neither whales nor whale products are actually im-
ported into the United States. The Packwood-Magnuson Amendment is inap-
plicable because Norway has no fishing allocations in U.S. waters.
70. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(1).
71. Id. The Amendment also has provisions which apply to any "interna-
tional program for endangered or threatened species." 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(2).
72. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(1). It is interesting to note that a violation of IWC
rules does not automatically establish a diminution of effectiveness for pur-
poses of the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments. See Japan Whaling
Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
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the certified nation for as long as the President deems
appropriate. 73
To date, the sanctions called for by the Pelly Amendment
have never actually been imposed. Nevertheless, the Pelly
Amendment has been useful to the United States in its fight to
stop whaling. Since 1972, several foreign nations have been cer-
tified pursuant to the Pelly Amendment. 74 In many of these
cases, even though no sanctions were imposed, the threat of
sanctions was enough to reform the whaling practices of the cer-
tified nation. 75 On numerous other occasions, the mere threat of
certification has been a sufficient incentive for offending nations
to comply with international restrictions on whaling. 76 Thus,
even without the imposition of actual sanctions, the Pelly
Amendment has been highly effective in obtaining compliance
with IWC quotas and regulations.
III. THE CURRENT WHALING DEBATE
Largely as a result of U.S. efforts in this area, the number of
whales harvested by the global whaling community has de-
creased gradually over the last few decades. 77 However, the re-
cent quantitative decline in annual whale harvests does not
mean that the international debate over whaling is coming to a
foreseeable end. Certain nations, most notably Norway and Ja-
pan, appear unwilling to bend in their opposition to the recently
affirmed moratorium on commercial whaling imposed by the
73. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(aX4). The only limitation on the President's authority
is that sanctions may be imposed only "to the extent that such a prohibition is
sanctioned by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade." Id. For a discus-
sion of whether the Pelly Amendment conforms to the rules of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, see infra part IV.
74. Between 1971 and 1989, certification pursuant to the Pelly Amend-
ment occurred nine times. Martin & Brennan, supra note 65, at 296.
75. For example, in 1978, in response to violations of IWC quotas, the
United States certified Chile, Peru, and the Republic of Korea. After the gov-
ernments of those nations were informed of possible sanctions under the Pelly
Amendment, all three took steps to join the IWC. Id. at 297.
76. In 1980, after exceeding the IWC quota on fin whales, Spain entered
into bilateral consultations with the United States. At that time, the United
States informed Spain of the possible applicability of the Pelly and Packwood-
Magnuson Amendments. Subsequently, Spanish whalers complied with IWC
catch limits. Id.
77. The annual total of whale catches declined gradually every year from
1980 to 1988. TABLE OF CATCHES SINCE 1980 (IWC, Cambridge, U.K.) 1992.
The total decrease was from a catch of 14,810 whales in 1980 to only 666 in
1988. Id. 706 whales were caught in 1991, however. Id.
Vol. 3:97
NORWEIGIA WHALNo
IWC. 78 Norway has gone one step further and, claiming that
there is no danger to the stability of whale populations, has re-
sumed very limited commercial whaling of North Atlantic minke
whales.79
In the eyes of leading environmentalists, "Norway's unilat-
eral decision to resume commercial whaling.., puts the nation
completely at odds with... the European Community, U.S. law
and, indeed, with the rest of the world." 0 While this claim may
be a slight exaggeration,8 ' the weight of international opinion is
strongly against Norway on this issue.8 2 The European Commu-
nity (EC) and the United States are at the forefront of interna-
tional opposition to Norway's resumption of commercial
whaling.
The EC's reaction to Norway's decision to resume whaling
has been dramatic. Although current EC legislation does not to-
tally prohibit whaling, members of the European Parliament
were astonished by Norway's decision. 3 Because Norway and
the EC are currently involved in negotiations regarding Nor-
way's possible accession to the EC, the EC's dissatisfaction with
Norwegian whaling policies undoubtedly carries a considerable
amount of weight in Oslo. Although Norway is seeking conces-
sions from the EC on the whaling issue,84 anti-whaling senti-
78. Prior to the IWC's recent annual meeting, one publication described the
situation like this:
[t]he rather shaky ban on commercial whaling is under severe pressure
from Norway which wants to resume hunting minke whales and has
threatened to leave the organisation that regulates whaling if it does
not get its way.... [T]he Japanese have equally indicated they could
follow suit if the ban is not lifted.
Whaling Conference Opens Amidst Growing Controversy, European Report,
May 8, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File.
79. "Norway plans to catch 296 minke whales this year in defiance of a
1985 moratorium imposed by the [IWC]. Oslo says the northeast Atlantic
minke whale stock has recovered to 86,700 and that it is safe to kill some."
Stella Bugge, Norway Will Not Give in on Whaling, Slams U.S. Move, Reuter
Newswire - Western Europe, Aug. 11, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Allnws File.
80. COMMERCIAL WHALING INFORMATION KIT, supra note 3.
81. Norway does have pro-whaling allies in Japan, Iceland, and a few other
nations.
82. See infra notes 218-33 and accompanying text.
83. Norway Set to Resume Whaling, Europe Environment, Apr. 15, 1993,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File.
84. In 1993, during accession talks, Sweden received concessions from the
EC which will allow them to continue hunting bears, beavers, and other ani-
mals which are protected by the Community's Directive on Habitats and Pro-
tected Species. Janet McEvoy, Sweden Intends to Stick to Higher
Environmental Standards, Reuter European Community Report, June 8, 1993,
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ment within the Community represents a formidable hurdle
which Norway must clear if it wants to become an EC member.8 5
Consistent with its position as the world's dominant anti-
whaling nation,8 6 the United States has joined the EC in exert-
ing pressure on the Norwegian government to abandon whaling
altogether. The main tool that the United States has employed
in these efforts is the threat of import sanctions. As noted previ-
ously, the Pelly Amendment gives the U.S. President the power
to ban imports of certain fishery and wildlife products from na-
tions whose actions diminish the effectiveness of an interna-
tional conservation program like the IWC.8 7
In October, 1993, President Clinton decided to postpone the
final decision on possible sanctions against Norwegian im-
ports.8 8 Although the President said that the situation was "se-
rious enough to justify sanctions,"8 9 he determined that U.S.
objectives could best be achieved by "delaying the implementa-
tion of sanctions until we have exhausted all good-faith efforts to
persuade Norway to follow agreed conservation measures."90
Although it has been given a reprieve, the threat of sanctions
still looms over Norway as it contemplates its commercial whal-
ing plans in 1994.91
The current debate over Norway's resumption of commer-
cial whaling provides a representative example of the more gen-
available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File. Norway finds these conces-
sions "politically interesting" since whales are included in that same Directive.
Boycott of Norwegian Exports Continues over Whaling Controversy, Europe En-
vironment, July 6, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File.
85. The European Commission has "made it quite clear that continued
whaling could compromise Norway's chances for admission to the European
Community." Norway Set to Resume Whaling, supra note 83.
86. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
88. Clinton to Delay Sanctions on Norwegians for Whaling, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 6, 1993, at A9.
89. James Morrison, Embassy Row, WASH. TiMEs, Oct. 6, 1993, at A13.
90. Clinton to Delay Sanctions on Norwegians for Whaling, supra note 88,
at A9.
91. Many observers expect the issue of sanctions to flare up again in the
spring of 1994. Whaling Decision Brings Sigh of Relief, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Oct. 6, 1993, at A4. There is reason to believe that Norway might not receive
such favorable treatment next time. According to White House officials, "Nor-
way's recent mediation of the historic agreement between Israel and the Pales-
tinian Liberation Organization was among the considerations in Clinton's
decision .... " Clinton Delays Norway Sanctions, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Oct. 5,
1993, at All. It seems likely that the President will have fewer reservations
about imposing sanctions in the spring.
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eral dichotomy between trade policy and environmental policy.92
Questions surrounding the scientific accuracy in measuring the
environmental impact of whaling93 have clouded the debate and
inhibited progress in reaching an effective compromise. An ex-
amination of the competing arguments surrounding Norway's
resumption of commercial whaling provides a backdrop against
which to analyze the scientific and emotional aspects of the
whaling debate, as well as its international legal implications.
A. TRENDS IN WHALE POPULATIONS
The necessity of conserving truly endangered species of
whales is well established. Even though it has resumed whal-
ing, Norway has made it clear that "the Government of Norway
supports the conservation of species, including marine mammals
that are threatened with extinction or serious depletion."94 The
danger of extinction is a threshold issue in the current whaling
debate, and the trend in whale populations is a critically impor-
tant issue in resolving that debate.
Whale stocks are currently increasing. Of course, some spe-
cies are increasing faster than others. However, populations of
most stocks remain far below their unexploited, pre-whaling
levels.95 Nevertheless, the recent efforts at conservation are
having a positive impact on global whale populations. 96 The
bowhead whale - the species that has perhaps come the closest
to extinction - provides a dramatic example of the resiliency of
certain whale populations. In 1976, the world population of
bowhead whales was uncertain, but experts estimated it at only
2,000.9 7 Amazingly, only twelve years later, the IWC deter-
mined that the stock of bowhead whales in the Bering-Chukchi-
92. See supra note 9.
93. See infra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
94. The Norwegian Government's Decision to Resume Commercial Small-
Type Whaling in 1993, NORWAY INFORMATION (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs), Aug. 1993 [hereinafter Decision to Resume].
95. As an example of extremely limited growth, after a decades-long ban on
commercial whaling of right whales, their worldwide population was still esti-
mated at less than 5,000 in 1990. Janet Rae-Dupree & Greg Krikorian, Right
Rare Sight; Catalina Ferry Encounters Seldom Seen Whale, L.A. TIMEs, May 18,
1990, at B1.
96. For example, in early 1993, based on estimates that the population of
California gray whales had quadrupled since 1946, that species was removed
from the endangered species list by U.S. officials. Maia Davis, Back in the
Swim, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 2, 1993, at B1.
97. Victor B. Scheffer, Exploring the Lives of Whales, 150 NAT'L GEO-
GRAPHIC 752, 755 (Dec. 1976). Dr. Scheffer's 1976 estimates were criticized, if
at all, for being overly optimistic. Id. at 754.
1994] 109
110 ~Mw. J GLOBAL TRADE [o.39
Beafort Seas of the Northern Pacific alone had a population of
approximately 7,500.98 This represents a population increase of
over 300%.
It is extremely difficult, however, for scientists to measure
whale populations with any degree of accuracy. 99 The first prob-
lem involves the methods by which records of whale populations
are kept. The IWC subdivides each species of whale into geo-
graphical "stocks." For example, minke whales are split into
stocks labelled "Southern Hemisphere," "North Atlantic," and
"North Pacific."' 00 While, theoretically, these stocks are isolated
from one another, one of the myriad problems associated with
assessing whale populations is the definition of the stocks them-
selves. In 1993, Norway itself recognized this problem when it
set out the following objective for its marine management pro-
gram: "To clarify the question of actual separation between
management stock units of minke whales in the North Atlantic,
and to investigate migration and the possible interchange be-
tween stocks."10 1
In addition to the problem of stock definition, there is
the larger problem of actual physical measurement. Although
the pace of technology continues to advance in the 1990s,
there are still no entirely satisfactory methods for determin-
ing the number of whales within a given geographic area.
Despite efforts to develop new measurement techniques, 0 2
the traditional methods of "sightings"10 3 and "catch per unit
98. WHALE POPULATION ASSESSMENTS (IWC, Cambridge, U.K) 1992.
99. See infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
100. WHALE POPULATION ASSESSMENTS, supra note 98. In addition, these
stocks are often subdivided even further. The North Atlantic minke whale
stock consists of "Northeastern," "Central," and "West Greenland" subgroups.
Id.
101. Norway's Integrated Research Program on: Whales and Seals, NORWAY
INFORMATION (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Feb. 1993.
102. The lWC has proposed using sightings conducted by helicopters to
measure whale populations. 39 REP. INT. WHAL. CoMN 46 (1989). It has also
proposed estimating population using biological parameters. 37 REP. INT.
WHAL. COMM'N 33 (1987). The Japan Whaling Association has even suggested
using satellite tracking. Japan Whaling Association: Commercial Whaling No
Longer a Threat to Whale Populations, in Hearing, supra note 43, at 70.
103. Measuring whale stocks by sightings usually consists of stationing ob-
servers on oceangoing vessels and recording their isolated observations, from
which conclusions are drawn about the overall whale population in the area.
See, e.g., Annual Reports of the Scientific Committee, 30-41 REP. INT. WHAL.
COMM'N (1980-91). Such sightings can not be trusted to provide accurate esti-
mates, however, for many reasons. The most obvious reason is that observers
commonly miss whales because they are underwater. 39 REP. INT. WHAL.
COMM'N 88 (1989). Problems also arise from observer error or inexperience. Id.
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effort"10 4 (CPUE) are still the most commonly used methods.
Unfortunately, significant problems are associated with the use
of both of these techniques.l05
The difficulty associated with the measurement of whale
populations has long been one of the central issues in the debate
over whaling. According to Norway, "[t]he uncertainty sur-
rounding the size of the Northeast Atlantic minke whale stock
was one of the reasons why the [Norwegian] Government intro-
duced a temporary ban on catches of the species [in] 1987."106
Likewise, the need for more data was one of the rationales be-
hind the U.S. pursuit of a global moratorium in the early
1980s. 10 7 On the other hand, one of the main planks of Nor-
way's current pro-whaling platform is that research methods
have improved to the point where sufficiently accurate measure-
ments of whale stocks are now possible. 10 8 The adequacy of
whale stock estimates will continue to be an important issue.
B. THE PRO-WHALING POSITION
Relying principally on the increase in whale populations
and alleged improvements in the measurement of whale stocks,
Norway recently resumed limited commercial whaling opera-
tions.'0 9 The Norwegian government set a 160-whale quota on
Frozen water prevents observers from conducting counts in some northern seas.
37 REP. INT. WHAL. COMM'N 90 (1987). Fog has caused similar difficulties. 38
REP. INT. WHAL. COMM'N 89 (1988).
104. CPUE measurements are based on the idea that, when more whales
are present in a given area, less effort will be required to catch one of them.
Therefore, the number of whales caught for each man-hour spent hunting
whales in a certain area can be used to estimate the overall size of the whale
population in that area. See, e.g., Annual Reports of the Scientific Committee,
30-41 REP. INT. WHAL. COMM'N (1980-91). The most serious problem with using
CPUE is the lack of detailed catch records from the early years of whaling. 38
REP. INT. WHAL. COMM'N 89 (1988). Additionally, the IWC lacks an adequate
statistical model to explain the data which is available. 37 REP. INT. WHAL.
COmm'N 44 (1987). Indeed, even Norway concedes that CPUE is "a very inaccu-
rate technique." Norwegian minke whaling, supra note 34, at 2.
105. See supra notes 103-04.
106. Norwegian minke whaling, supra note 34, at 2.
107. One advocate of a global moratorium noted that since "there is such
limited data for most of the populations, we ought to stop and secure more data
.... " Hearing, supra note 43, at 20 (statement of Thomas Garrett, Soc'y for
Animal Protective Legislation).
108. The thrust of Norway's argument is that, in the last several years, "it
has become clear that the decision to classify the Northeast Atlantic minke
whale as a Protection Stock was ... made on an erroneous basis." Hoist State-
ment, supra note 6.
109. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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the commercial catch of minke whales in 1993.110 Despite oppo-
sition from all sides and a privately organized boycott of Norwe-
gian products,"' Norwegian whalers almost filled the
commercial quota by the time the 1993 hunt ended on Septem-
ber 12.112
Norway bases its open defiance of the IWC's global morato-
rium113 on evidence which strongly suggests that minke whale
stocks have recovered to the point where a limited annual har-
vest poses no threat to the continuation of the species. 114 Ac-
cording to the best available estimates in September 1992, the
Northeastern Atlantic stock of minke whales has increased to
approximately 87,000.115 Assuming this estimate to be accu-
rate, the 1993 catch quota of 160 minke whales represents less
than 0.2% of the total population of the Northeastern Atlantic
stock. Norway also advances the position that this stock of
minke whales is currently growing at a rate of 2% per year.116 If
Norway's figures are correct, the mathematical logic of Norway's
position is readily apparent. 117
In addition to the use of scientific evidence, Norway ad-
vances several other arguments in support of a limited commer-
cial harvest. For example, Norwegian officials argue that
whaling is an important means of livelihood for Norway's small
coastal communities. 118 In this context, Norway stresses that
110. Bugge, supra note 79. Norwegian commercial whaling is limited to
minke whales.
111. Boycott of Norwegian Exports Continues over Whaling Controversy,
supra note 84. In Europe, the boycott is spearheaded by several large German
companies which have stopped buying many types of Norwegian goods, includ-
ing fish products. Id. The boycott has also taken hold in the United States,
where Burger King has cancelled a large contract to buy frozen fish from Nor-
wegian suppliers. Norwegian Decision to Hunt Whales Sparks Boycott, Could
Affect U.S. Trade, Intl Trade Daily (BNA), May 28, 1993, available in LEXIS,
BNA Library, BNAITD File.
112. Whaling Decision Brings Sigh of Relief, supra note 91.
113. From a technical standpoint, Norway is not actually violating the rules
of the IWC because it has filed an objection to the moratorium and, thus, is not
bound by its terms. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. However, any
active whaling operations run afoul of the spirit of the moratorium.
114. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
115. WHALE POPULATION AsSESSMENTS, supra note 98. Despite all the afore-
mentioned problems with measuring whale stocks, the IWC's Scientific Com-
mittee has determined with 95% confidence that the North Atlantic minke
whale population is somewhere between 61,000 and 117,000. Id.
116. Morrison, supra note 89.
117. If a species reproduces at a rate of ten times the rate of attrition due to
hunting, extinction would seem to be highly improbable.
118. Norwegian minke whaling, supra note 34.
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minke whaling is generally carried on by small, family-owned
fishing boats, as opposed to the "industrial, capital-intensive
whaling of former years."119 Thus, while "[tihe income from
Norwegian minke whaling may appear insignificant for the
country's economy,.., it is of great importance to the families
and local communities directly involved."120
In an interestingly ironic twist, Norway has also advanced
several arguments that whaling is a "green" industry - i.e.,
that it is friendly to the environment. For example, in the opin-
ion of Norwegian officials, "[t]he use of selective equipment to
catch fish and [marine mammals] is perhaps the most environ-
mentally-sound way of producing food for human consumption
today ... ."121 Norwegian scientists also argue that controlled
whaling is essential to the effective conservation of other forms
of marine life. 122 According to Norway's Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs, "[a]rbitrary conservation decisions not based on [sound sci-
entific] advice may have negative environmental and
developmental consequences, threatening the balance of the
ecosystem." 123
Norway indirectly justifies its position by attacking the mo-
tivation and credibility of its critics. The main target of this at-
tack has been Greenpeace and the other anti-whaling
environmental groups. In a speech to the Norwegian parlia-
ment, Norway's Minister of Foreign Affairs made the claim that
"[p]rivate international pressure groups view whaling cam-
paigns as an important source of income. The fact that it is now
clear that the minke whale is an abundant species does not fit
well with their plans."1 24 Furthermore, Norway disparages the
integrity of the governments of anti-whaling nations, alleging
that "they may be tempted to find a cheap way of easing their
consciences for their lack of effort in the environmental field." 125
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. The reasoning behind this statement is that "the environment re-
mains unaffected, energy consumption is low in relation to yield, and there is no
pollution from fertilizers, pesticides or other chemicals." Id.
122. "Whales... in the Northeast Atlantic Ocean... have a great impact on
stocks of fish and crustaceans and thus compete with man for fisheries re-
sources." Lars Folkow, Impact of Marine Mammals on Stocks of Fish and Crus-
taceans, ARKTISK FORENING, Oct. 1990, at 1.
123. Decision to Resume, supra note 94.
124. Hoist Statement, supra note 6.
125. Id.
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Such comments, although lacking an evidentiary basis,126
strongly indicate Norway's determination to preserve whaling.
Perhaps Norway's most powerful argument is simply that
its current whaling practices are nobody else's business. In the
words of Norway's Minister of Foreign Affairs, "[ilf countries are
permitted to force one another to accept rules prohibiting the
use of resources without there being a sound basis for this, the
very foundation of international cooperation and international
agreement on environment and development issues will be en-
dangered."127 Norway asserts that the "right of a nation to util-
ize available natural resources on a scientific and sustainable
basis"128 should not be abridged solely on the basis of another
nation's emotional attachments to a particular species. In this
respect, Norway is justified in its concern that a surrender on
the whaling issue could set a dangerous precedent having signif-
icantly detrimental long-term effects.
Despite all of its efforts to justify a limited commercial
catch, Norway has not yet finalized its whaling policies for 1994.
Although Norway has vowed not to give in to protests, boycotts,
and embargo threats, 129 Norwegian officials have delayed the
decision on whether a hunt will be allowed in 1994. Norwegian
Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland has said that a decision
will be made following the next annual meeting of the IWC in
May, 1994.130
C. CONSERVATIONIST ARGUMENTS
Opponents of commercial whaling, in their fight to end Nor-
wegian minke whaling, have advanced several persuasive func-
tional arguments. One of these pragmatic contentions is that
whales must be universally protected due to their value "as a
symbol for world concern for the environment."13 1 The basis of
this position is that whales, by virtue of their brush with extinc-
126. The above quote, for example, was used simply as a way to focus atten-
tion on all the environmentally-conscious actions for which Norway has been
responsible, rather than to point out shortcomings in the environmental policies
of any other nation. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Bugge, supra note 80.
130. Whaling Decision Brings Sigh of Relief, supra note 91.
131. Kutner, supra note 1, at 133. Much of whales' symbolic value is due to
the way that concern for whales has grown along with concern for the environ-
ment in general. See supra notes 2-4, 49 and accompanying text.
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tion and their subsequent resurgence, "have become symbols of
the fate of all species on Earth."132
The second important functional argument against Nor-
way's actions is that they "could cause a massive unravelling of
international environmental law."133 While environmentalists
are naturally concerned about the impact that Norway's decision
may have on whaling and the IWC, 1 3 4 the concern runs much
deeper. In the eyes of some environmentalists, "if Norway is
successful in destroying the IWC, other nations with objections
to other conservation treaties ... will be encouraged to with-
draw, threatening the delicate global support for international
environmental protection." 135
Notwithstanding these rather functional anti-whaling argu-
ments, the most important arguments against whaling consist of
highly sentimental appeals based on the distinctive characteris-
tics that whales are said to possess. There are a wide variety of
theories advanced in support of this position, including whales'
high intelligence, 136 the inhumanity of current killing meth-
ods, 137 and the human-like qualities often attributed to
whales. 138 Thus, the unique nature of whales plays a vital role
in defining and evaluating the emotional arguments against
Norway's recent resumption of commercial whaling.
Whales are the largest creatures to inhabit the Earth.139
Their enormous size enables them to conserve body heat in the
frigid temperatures of the ocean depths. 140 Another noteworthy
characteristic of whales is their highly migratory nature. Scien-
132. COMMERCIAL WHALING INFORMATION KIT, supra note 3. "Nature sym-
bols" are important since societies use such symbols "to develop understanding
about relationships between people and with the natural world." Arne Kalland,
Super Whale: The Use of Myths and Symbols in Environmentalism, 11 ESSAYS
ON WHALEs AND MAN 5 (1993) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of Global
Trade).
133. COMMERCIAL WHAIING INFORMATION Krr, supra note 3.
134. "If Norway resumes commercial whaling, in defiance of the IWC, other
nations, such as Japan and Iceland, will likely follow. The result could signal
the total collapse of the IWC. . . ." Id.
135. Id.
136. See infra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
137. COMMERCIAL WHALING INFORMATION KIT, supra note 3. In this context,
modern whaling has been likened to "shooting a harpoon into a moose and drag-
ging it alive behind a car." Id.
138. See infra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
139. Graves, supra note 4, at 732. The blue whale can reach lengths of up to
100 feet and weigh up to 200 tons. Id.
140. Scheffer, supra note 97, at 759. Sperm whales are thought to dive to
depths of well over a mile below the surface of the sea. Id. at 761.
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tists use a number of methods to track whales in order to docu-
ment their yearly journeys. 14 1 The results have shown that
whales are, indeed, true world travellers. Every winter, for ex-
ample, gray whales will migrate from Arctic feeding waters
down to mating sanctuaries off the coast of southern California,
a round trip of approximately 10,000 miles. 142
Perhaps the most striking aspects of whales are their so-
called "human-like" qualities. One of the most well-known and
least documented of these qualities is the high intelligence level
of whales. Like humans, whales' brains are disproportionately
large with respect to the size and complexity of their bodies. 143
Although this fact alone does not conclusively denote a high in-
telligence,'" there are other factors, such as complex social hi-
erarchies 145 and the ability to commiunicate, 146 which suggest
that whales are, indeed, highly intellectual creatures. 147
There is even evidence that whales may experience feelings
which are closely akin to human emotions. 148 Scientists gener-
ally agree that many whales live in family groups which stay
141. Among these tracking methods are several different ways of attaching
radio transmitters to the smooth bodies of whales. Id.
142. Kutner, supra note 1, at 129.
143. Scientists can use a number known as the Encephalisation Quotient
(EQ) to measure the size of an animal's brain compared to the size and complex-
ity of its body and its metabolic rate. Halt the Brain Drain - Help the Whale,
Reuters-Independent, Aug. 23, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Allnws File. While chimpanzees' EQ is only around 3.0, bottlenose dolphins
(close relatives of whales) boast an EQ of 5.6. The EQ of humans is approxi-
mately 7.4. Id.
144. One of the problems with measuring whale intelligence may be
humans' limited frame of reference. As one work has queried, "[wihat do we
mean by intelligence?" KARL-ERIK FICHTELIUS & SVERRE SJOLANDER, SMARTER
THAN MAN? 144 (Thomas Teal trans., 1972). In other words, just because
whales' brains function in the same physiological way as those of humans, "does
not mean that the intellectual activity must be the same." Id. at 145.
145. Again, using bottlenose dolphins as an analog, it is interesting to note
that they spend approximately one-third of their time maintaining social ties
within their dolphin "communities". Halt the Brain Drain - Help the Whale,
supra note 143.
146. Not only do whales communicate with each other through various dif-
ferent sounds, they can do so over remarkable distances. There have been docu-
mented cases of humpback whales emitting their "songs" at depths which fall
within two "sound reflecting layers" of the ocean. FicHTELrus & SJOLANDER,
supra note 144, at 135. Such a sound, emitted at such a place, could be heard
by a human ear over 25,000 miles away. Id.
147. Not all scientists agree, however, that "the whale" has all the charac-
teristics which are often attributed to it. See infra text accompanying notes
213-16.
148. In the opinion of two of the leading environmental groups in this field,
"lilt has long been established as fact that whales are sentient, socially complex,
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together for years at a time.149 In addition, some whales exhibit
behavior which strongly resembles human kindness or altru-
ism.150 In the words of one noted marine mammologist, whales
are "endowed with social instincts, family bonds, and capacities
that seem at times very close to human feelings." 151 Further-
more, there is even evidence that whales may grow psychotic
and even suicidal in captivity.152
The organizations and governments opposing Norway base
many of their arguments on the unique characteristics of whales
detailed above. Their central argument is that, due to these
characteristics, it is simply wrong to kill whales. Usually, how-
ever, all of the specific theories about whales tend to combine to
form a generalized appeal based almost exclusively on emo-
tion. 153 Thus, it is also necessary to examine the debate in the
context of more objective criteria.
IV. THE PERMISSIBILITY OF PELLY AMENDMENT
SANCTIONS UNDER GATT
One question which arises in evaluating the use of meas-
ures such as Pelly Amendment sanctions to enforce interna-
tional whale conservation programs is whether such sanctions
would be consistent with GATT. GATT is "the central organiza-
intelligent, playful, gregarious, altruistic, and, with respect to humans, incredi-
bly benevolent." COMMERCIAL WHALING INFORMATION KIT, supra note 3.
149. Scheffer, supra note 97, at 759.
150. In the days of non-exploding harpoons, when a sperm whale was
harpooned, "[aipparently it was not uncommon for companions of the
harpooned animal to gather around it and attempt to bite off the harpoon or the
harpoon line, which they often managed to do." Firmus & SJOLANDER,
supra note 144, at 142.
151. Scheffer, supra note 97, at 759.
152. According to the HSUS, whales are "socially complex and highly intelli-
gent and cannot withstand stressful removal from the wild and life in a small
pool." COMMERCIAL WHALING INFORMATION KIT, supra note 3. In support of this
theory, the HSUS notes that beluga whales live for 25 to 50 years in the wild, as
opposed to five to seven years in captivity. Id. Even more dramatically, one
American researcher believes that suicide claimed the lives of several of his
bottlenose dolphins. Scheffer, supra note 97, at 764.
153. The emotional nature of many anti-whaling arguments is demon-
strated by the following Humane Society quote: "Will the seas continue to red-
den with blood? Will the great whales' mysterious songs, which echo through
the unfathomable deep, continue to be replaced by cries of agony and death?
Will thousands of whales be brutally hunted down, their families destroyed?"
Slaughter on the High Seas, CLOSE-UP RPT. (HSUS, Gaithersburg, Md.), Feb.
1993.
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tion for coordinating national policies on international trade."154
Its goal is to reduce or eliminate barriers to international
trade.155 Toward that end, GATT Article XI prohibits all mem-
ber nations from imposing any form of quantitative restriction
on imports or exports. 156
The import prohibition contemplated by the Pelly Amend-
ment is a quantitative restriction of the most serious kind be-
cause it is an absolute prohibition on the importation of certain
goods. 157 Thus, the Amendment is manifestly inconsistent with
GATT Article XI. 158 Moreover, the ban called for by the Pelly
Amendment would apply to goods which are unrelated to
whaling.
In United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna ("Tuna/
Dolphin"), Mexico challenged the GATT consistency of a U.S.
prohibition on Mexican tuna imports. 159 The United States im-
plemented the ban because fishing methods of the Mexican tuna
industry killed more dolphins incidentally than permitted under
the MMPA. 160 The United States unsuccessfully argued that
the prohibition did not violate Article XI, but was instead per-
missible as an internal regulation under Article 111.161 The
United States contended that the ban sought to protect dolphins
by regulating the production of tuna itself and thus was consis-
tent with Article 111.162 In the context of Pelly Amendment
sanctions, however, such an argument would not even be avail-
154. JOHN H. JACKSON & WiLLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 295 (2nd ed. 1986).
155. The GATI preamble states that the Agreement is designed to facilitate
"reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substan-
tial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of
discriminatory treatment in international commerce." GATT pmbl.
156. GATT art. XI:A. Specifically, Article XI:1 forbids "prohibitions or re-
strictions other than duties... on the importation of any product" of any other
GATT member. Id. Note that Norway and the United States are both members
of the GATr and were, in fact, two of the original members. Id. pmbl.
157. In Tuna/Dolphin, although the United States argued that Article XI
did not apply to the MNMPA, it did not dispute the fact that sanctions like those
imposed by the MMPA and the Pelly Amendment are, indeed, quantitative re-
strictions. Tuna/Dolphin, supra note 54, at 1618.
158. It is interesting to note that the Pelly Amendment, by its own terms,
requires that any sanctions imposed must conform to GATT. See supra note 73.
159. See Tuna/Dolphin, supra note 54.
160. Id. at 1599.
161. Id. at 1603-05. Internal regulations fall under GATT Article III, which
allows a government to adopt any internal regulation it chooses, so long as the
regulation provides foreign goods no less favorable treatment than like domes-
tic products. GATT art. III:4.
162. Tuna/Dolphin, supra note 54, at 1603.
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able. The import restrictions contemplated by the Pelly Amend-
ment would apply to a variety of fishery and wildlife products
unrelated to whaling. Thus, Pelly Amendment sanctions would
simply be a blatant, unilateral attempt to affect the policies of
another nation through the use of economic force.
Although Pelly Amendment sanctions would clearly violate
GATT Article XI, GATT contains several broad exceptions which
apply to most GATT rules. 163 Two of these exceptions are par-
ticularly relevant to possible U.S. sanctions against Norway.
Article XX(b) is a broad exception for measures which are "nec-
essary to protect human, animal or plant life or health."16 4 Arti-
cle XX(g) is an exception which applies to measures "relating to
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such meas-
ures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on do-
mestic production or consumption." 165
The first paragraph of Article XX imposes two conditions on
the application of any Article XX exception. First, the measure
taken must not constitute arbitrary or unjustified discrimina-
tion.16 6 Second, the measure must not be a disguised restriction
on trade.167 If the United States eventually decides to prohibit
certain Norwegian imports, such a prohibition would be a dis-
criminatory trade measure because it would apply only to the
products of one particular nation. 168 However, the sanctions
would be neither arbitrary nor unjustified because they would
clearly be aimed at conservation, and would affect only Norway,
the one nation in the world openly disregarding the IWC mora-
torium. 16 9 As for the second broad condition of Article XX, none
163. Although the apparently broad application of the Article XX exceptions
makes them potentially subject to abuse, they are necessary to allow special
trade measures against imports to be used as part of a domestic regulatory
scheme. JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAw OF GATT' 743 (1969).
164. GATT art. XX(b).
165. GATT art. XX(g).
166. GATT art. XX.
167. Id.
168. Ted L. McDorman, The GATT Consistency of U.S. Fish Import Embar-
goes to Stop Driftnet Fishing and Save Whales, Dolphins and Turtles, 24 GEo.
WASH. J. INTVL L. & ECON. 477, 522 (1991). U.S. sanctions against Norway
would be discriminatory because they would apply only to Norwegian products.
Thus, by definition, such sanctions would discriminate between products of
Norway and those of other countries.
169. Article XX prohibits the application of any measure "in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail." GATT art. XX. Since the "condi-
tion" currently prevailing in Norway - i.e., the open practice of commercial
whaling - does not exist in any other country, no sanctions imposed against
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of the parties involved suggest that U.S. sanctions would consti-
tute a disguised restriction on international trade. 170
GATT Article XX(b) allows a contracting party to violate a
GATT rule if such a violation is "necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health."171 With new evidence tending to
show that minke whales in the North Atlantic are no longer en-
dangered, 172 it is doubtful that Pelly Amendment sanctions in
this particular case would be "necessary" to protect the contin-
ued existence of the species. However, even if sanctions were
found to be necessary, the inquiry would not end there. In
Tuna/Dolphin, the GATT panel considered the drafting history
of Article XX(b) in order to fashion a condition on this exception
which does not appear in the text of GATT. 173
The Tuna/Dolphin panel found that Article XX(b) was in-
tended to allow a government to violate GATT only when neces-
sary to protect the well-being of human, animals or plants
within that government's own jurisdiction. 174 With this con-
struction in mind, the United States may argue that the migra-
tory nature of whales makes them part of an ecosystem which
transcends national borders 175 and that they are, therefore, a
suitable subject for protective efforts by all nations. 176 However,
the United States presented a similar argument in Tuna/
Dolphin and the panel found it unconvincing. Although the
panel did not directly address the issue, it "considered that if the
broad interpretation of Article XX(b) suggested by the United
Norway could be considered arbitrary or unjustifiable within the meaning of
Article XX.
170. The GATTs prohibition against "disguised restrictions on trade" has
been interpreted by a Canada-U.S. FTA panel to require "that trade-restricting
conservation measures must in fact have a true conservation purpose." In re
Canada's Landing Requirements for Salmon and Herring, Oct. 16, 1989, 12
ITRD 1026, 1036. Although Norwegian officials have voiced several complaints
about possible U.S. sanctions, see, e.g., supra note 125 and accompanying text,
they have not, however, asserted that such sanctions would be imposed for any
purpose other than the conservation of whales.
171. GATT art. XX(b).
172. See infra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
173. Tuna/Dolphin, supra note 54. Specifically, the panel found that "the
concerns of the drafters of Article XX(b) focused on the use of sanitary measures
to safeguard life or health of humans, animals or plants within the jurisdiction
of the importing country." Id. at 1620.
174. Id.
175. "Whales, which spend their entire lives roaming over the oceans of our
planet, are true world citizens. They pass through man's carefully defined
boundaries without hesitation." Kutner, supra note 1, at 129.
176. Steve Charnovitz, The Environment vs. Trade Rules: Defogging the De-
bate, 23 ENVTL. L. 475, 497 (1992).
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States were accepted, each contracting party could unilaterally
determine the life or health protection policies from which other
contracting parties could not deviate ... "177 Although, techni-
cally, future panels are not bound by this prior panel decision, it
is highly unlikely that a future panel would find that Pelly
Amendment sanctions fit within the exception provided for in
Article XX(b). 178
Article XX(g) suspends GATT obligations for trade meas-
ures "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural re-
sources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption."179 The
precise meaning of this exception is somewhat unclear in the
wake of Tuna/Dolphin. The panel in that case drew upon an
earlier panel report 80 to support its finding that Article XX(g),
like Article XX(b), may not be applied in an "extrajurisdictional"
manner.' 81 Although the exact meaning of the term "extrajuris-
dictional" is not entirely clear,' 8 2 U.S. efforts to end Norwegian
whaling probably fall within this category, just as did its efforts
to reform the Mexican tuna fishing industry. Again, although
the outcome in Tuna/Dolphin is not binding precedent, it is an
indication of how narrowly Article XX is interpreted,8 3 and fu-
ture panels are unlikely to adopt a new interpretation.18 4
It should be noted that to the extent that the sanctions
called for by the Pelly Amendment are designed to enforce the
rules and quotas of the IWC, 85 such sanctions are based on a
177. Tuna/Dolphin, supra note 54, at 1620.
178. "Even though strict 'stare decisis' concepts of precedent do not apply in
international law, it is clear that in practice prior 'precedents' do have
weight.... Indeed, sometimes the deliberations of international dispute settle-
ment panels ... give every bit the appearance of common law lawyers arguing
precedent." JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 154, at 332.
179. GATT art. XX(g).
180. Tuna/Dolphin, supra note 54, at 1620-21. The earlier report upon
which the Tuna/Dolphin Panel relied for support for this proposition was GATT
Dispute Resolution Panel, Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Un-
processed Herring and Salmon, BISD 35th Supp. 98, 114 (1989) (panel report
adopted Mar. 22, 1988).
181. Tuna/Dolphin, supra note 54, at 1620.
182. It is interesting to note that "the panel did not offer any definition of an
extrajurisdictional offense, even though the panel apparently invented this
term." Charnovitz, supra note 176, at 497.
183. See Tuna/Dolphin, supra note 54, at 1619.
184. See supra note 178.
185. See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
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form of international consensus. 186 However, while there is
broad international sentiment against whaling, there has been
no demonstrated consensus on the use of unilateral measures by
any individual nation to enforce IWC rules. 187 Further, as the
GATT panel recognized in Tuna/Dolphin, unilateral actions are
rarely an appropriate way to deal with a threat to the environ-
ment.188 In the final analysis, unilateral measures are gener-
ally inconsistent with GATT's broad purpose of encouraging
reciprocal reduction of trade barriers.' 8 9
V. RESOLUTION OF THE WHALING DEBATE
The GATT inconsistency of Pelly Amendment sanctions is
an important factor in the current whaling debate, but it is not
the end of the story. 190 It is also important to examine the argu-
ments on either side of the debate from a common sense stand-
point. Such an examination reinforces the conclusion that U.S.
sanctions would be an inappropriate response to Norway's re-
sumption of commercial whaling.
A. ASSESSING THE MERITS
It is important to keep in mind that no nation, including
Norway, wants to resume commercial whaling of species that
are endangered. 191 Thus, the first question which must be an-
swered in resolving the whaling issue is whether Norway's sci-
entific arguments are valid, that is, whether the limited hunting
of minke whales is ecologically justifiable. Although, as noted,
whale stock populations are difficult to measure, 192 recent evi-
dence suggests that Norway is, indeed, correct in its contention
that minke whales will not be endangered by a carefully con-
186. In this respect, U.S. sanctions imposed against Norway would differ
from the prohibition on the importation of Mexican tuna. The standards of the
MMPA at issue in Tuna/Dolphin were purely of U.S. origin.
187. The Tuna/Dolphin panel suggested that negotiation of an international
dolphin protection agreement might have been "desirable." Tuna/Dolphin,
supra note 54, at 1620. Nowhere in its report, however, did the panel indicate
that the U.S. ban on Mexican tuna would have been permissible if it were based
on an international regulatory scheme.
188. The panel flatly stated that "a contracting party may not restrict im-
ports of a product merely because it originates in a country with environmental
policies different from its own." Tuna/Dolphin, supra note 54, at 1622.
189. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
190. See infra notes 226-29 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
192. See supra 102-05 and accompanying text.
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trolled commercial whaling season.193 In fact, the IWC's Scien-
tific Committee, following years of research and study, has
unanimously concluded that the minke whale population has re-
covered to the point where it can tolerate traditional whaling off
the coast of Norway.' 9 ' Because this evidence is so strongly in
Norway's favor, the crucial question is whether any of the anti-
whaling arguments are sufficient to warrant the imposition of
unilateral sanctions by the United States against Norway.
As noted earlier, one argument in favor of using U.S. law to
enforce a global moratorium on whaling is that whales deserve
to be protected on the basis of their status as symbols of world
environmental consciousness. 195 However, some evidence indi-
cates that whales have been chosen by environmental groups to
achieve this symbolic status on the basis of some very superficial
and pragmatic considerations. For example, Steve Sawyer, the
international director of Greenpeace, has admitted that "[o]ur
philosophy regarding issues [which we address] is extraordina-
rily pragmatic. We choose those we feel we are in a position to
win."196 Similarly, anthropologist Arne Kalland concludes,
"[]ecause... whaling is pursued by only a few nations and the
capital investment is small, campaigns against these activities
are especially tempting."197 In light of these factors, it is diffi-
193. The United States and other anti-whaling nations have now apparently
conceded the issue of ecological justification. In a release by the IWC, recent
developments were described thus:
The [group of nations resisting whaling] has argued in recent years
that commercial whaling cannot be allowed until there is firm evidence
on the status of the stocks, that guaranteed control and monitoring
systems are in place, and improvements are achieved in humane kill-
ing practices. However, the position of these countries became clearer
this year with the statement by the USA that it opposes the resumption
of commercial whaling even if these requisite conditions are satisfied.
WHALING AFTER THE 1993 MEETING OF THE IWC (IWC, Cambridge, U.K), July,
1993 (emphasis added).
194. IWC Committee Chairman's Resignation a Shout of Protest, supra note
52. The management scheme proposed by the IWC was the culmination of the
Comprehensive Assessment of whale stocks, begun by the IWC at its 1986 an-
nual meeting. WHALNG AFTER THE 1993 MEETING OF THE IWC, supra note 193.
195. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
196. Kalland, supra note 132, at 6 (alteration in original). Kalland explains,
conservationist and animal welfare groups both have a tendency to ad-
dress those issues which are easy to win. To win - or at least give the
impression of victory through intensive mass media assaults - is im-
portant to build up public trust in an organization[']s effectiveness and
therefore their legitimacy.
Id.
197. Id.
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cult to attribute much weight to the symbolic value of whales
when determining the desirability of unilateral U.S. action.
Another argument advanced by anti-whaling groups is that
Norwegian whaling practices will bring about the demise of the
IWC, and that if the IWC falls, other international environmen-
tal organizations will suffer the same fate. 198 This concern is
certainly understandable. If Norway is able to violate the IWC
with impunity, it would seem at least possible that other nations
might emulate Norway's actions in other contexts. However, the
current state of the IWC, 199 combined with the relationship
which exists between Norway and the IWC,20 0 is probably
unique enough to significantly lessen the possibility of such a
chain reaction.
First, as Norwegian officials eagerly point out, Norway's ac-
tions do not actually violate IWC rules. The International Con-
vention for the Regulation of Whaling provides that a nation
which objects to an IWC rule is automatically exempt from com-
pliance with that rule.201 Therefore, because Norway entered a
formal reservation against the IWC moratorium in 1982, its ac-
tions are, technically, not in violation of the ICRW. Ironically,
the same cannot be said of the IWC's actions. The purpose of the
ICRW is "to provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks
and thus make possible the orderly development of the whaling
industry."20 2 However, despite this clear expression of purpose,
it appears that the current members of the IWC are determined
to block any development of the whaling industry. 20 3 Therefore,
as Norway quite correctly contends, "[t]he position of member
countries of the IWC which oppose whaling on principle is in fact
in conflict with the Commission's own objectives."20 4
Second, the IWC is currently in such a state of disarray that
its overhaul or even its total demise would surprise virtually no
one and would have little effect on the life expectancy of other
international organizations. At the moment, the IWC is an or-
ganization in search of an identity. On one hand, the IWC was
198. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
199. See infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
200. See infra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
202. ORGANISATION AND FUNCTIONS (IWC, Cambridge, U.K.), May, 1993.
203. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
204. Norwegian minke whaling, supra note 34, at 4. In addition, as the Nor-
wegian government has pointed out, "Norway never agreed to join an organiza-
tion in which decisions on whale conservation are made on the basis of
emotional arguments and campaigns." Hoist Statement, supra note 6, at 5.
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set up to regulate the whaling industry on the basis of scientific
principles.20 5 On the other hand, by the IWC's own admission,
"a majority of [current IWC] members now seem to hold the view
that whales are not a resource to be utilised by hunting,"2 °6
thereby rejecting the scientific objectives of the organization. As
an example of the confusion caused by this conflict, the IWC it-
self refers to the current global moratorium as a "pause" in com-
mercial whaling,20 7 despite the fact that the moratorium
appears to be more or less permanent.208 The demise of a group
as internally confused and contradictory as the IWC would seem
to pose no great threat to other organizations which do not suf-
fer from such infirmities. Thus, Norway's secession from such
an organization is unlikely to touch off a chain reaction of simi-
lar incidents within other international organizations.
Finally, as noted above, anti-whaling arguments have a
strong sentimental appeal 20 9 because of the emotional way in
which whales are viewed by a large segment of the world's popu-
lation.210 Even if one accepts the existence of all of the traits of
whales that are cited in support of these emotional argu-
ments,21' however, one crucial question remains: Where do we
draw the line? In other words, are whales unique enough to be
seen as the only animals that are worthy of universal protection
or might the end of whaling be followed by a movement to end
other forms of hunting and fishing? This question has no easy
answer.
Some environmentalists argue that whales are, in fact,
truly unique creatures deserving of special protection.212 This
issue is far from settled, however, since some authorities argue
that "the whale" does not really have all of the characteristics
which are often attributed to it. Arne Kalland, an anthropolo-
gist at the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, has developed the
theory of the "super whale," which suggests that whales may not
be as unique as they seem.21 3 This theory points out that envi-
ronmentalists often speak of "the whale" in the singular when
205. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
206. WHALING AFTER THE 1993 MEETING OF THE IWC, supra note 193.
207. ORGANISATION AND FUNCTIONS, supra note 202.
208. See supra note 193.
209. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
210. See infra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 136-52.
212. See supra notes 139-52 and accompanying text for examples of the at-
tributes which allegedly make whales unique.
213. Kalland, supra note 132, at 7.
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discussing some of the qualities of individual species of
whales. 214 Yet, as Mr. Kalland observes, the particular qualities
which "do hold some truth are rarely true for more than one or
two of the more than 75 different whale species ..... 215 While
the mythical "super whale" may possess all of the amazing char-
acteristics which are ascribed to whales, no one particular spe-
cies of whale is quite as far removed from the rest of the Earth's
creatures.
The above discussion indicates that anti-whaling argu-
ments are based on emotion, rather than objective scientific cri-
teria. In light of this reality, unilateral U.S. sanctions would be
a particularly inappropriate response to Norway's resumption of
commercial whaling. As Norway forcefully argues, it would set
a dangerous precedent if the "right of a nation to utilize avail-
able natural resources on a scientific and sustainable basis" is
abridged on the basis of another nation's "emotional attach-
ments" to a particular species of animal. 216 A proliferation of
unilateral trade restrictions would soon follow if such measures
could be sustained by something as insubstantial as a fondness
for certain marine mammals. 217
B. WILL THE IssuE BE RESOLVED IN THE PRESENT CoNTExT?
The debate over Norwegian whaling and the possible impo-
sition of Pelly Amendment sanctions have the potential to sub-
stantially contribute to the evolution of the broader debate
concerning trade and the environment. Unfortunately, however,
the appropriateness of unilateral action might not be resolved in
the context of the present whaling debate. For several reasons,
it appears that the Norwegian government may be forced to give
up minke whaling before it is possible to analyze the practical
effects of the threat or the imposition of trade sanctions against
Norway. All signs indicate that Norway's efforts to win accept-
ance for its whaling practices are doomed to failure.
The privately organized boycott of Norwegian products con-
tinues to gain momentum. In July, several large German com-
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Hoist Statement, supra note 6, at 8.
217. Fred Singer, Director of the Science and Environmental Project, asks,
"[sihould we boycott the French for eating horsemeat and the Italians for eating
songbirds?" Fred Singer, Greens Sound a False Alarm on Whale Hunting,
WASH. TiEs, Oct. 3, 1993, at B2.
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panies 218  announced that they would join other large
corporations in the United States and elsewhere219 in boycotting
Norwegian products. The boycott has also been successful in ex-
erting pressure on the Norwegian government from unexpected
sources. A group of Norwegian businessmen, apparently swayed
by the possible economic impact of the boycott, have sued their
own country's government, alleging that its whaling policy vio-
lates Norway's anti-cruelty laws. 22 0
Another factor exerting pressure on Norway is the EC ac-
cession talks. Although Norway will continue to appeal to the
EC for concessions that would allow it to continue whaling, 221 it
is unclear whether such concessions will be granted.222 If Nor-
way is forced to make a decision between joining the EC and
standing firm on the whaling issue, economic concerns could
lead it to choose the former.223
In addition to all of these pressures, the possibility of U.S.
Pelly Amendment sanctions still looms over Norway. The issue
of sanctions is likely to flare up again in the spring of 1994.224
President Clinton's recent decision to "delay" sanctions was mo-
218. Boycott of Norwegian Exports Continues over Whaling Controversy,
supra note 84.
219. Norwegian Decision to Hunt Whales Sparks Boycott, Could Affect U.S.
Trade, supra note 111.
220. Patricia Forkan, NEws RELEASE (HSUS, Gaithersburg, Md.), July 14,
1993.
221. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
222. Norway's request is based largely on similar concessions which were
granted to Sweden to allow them to continue hunting bears, beavers, and cer-
tain species of birds. See supra note 84. Because whaling is much less popular
than hunting bears and beavers, public opinion within the EC will make it
much more difficult for Norway to get concessions than it was for Sweden. In
short, the EC ban on whaling is still "seen as one of the most thorny and domes-
tically explosive issues in [Norway's] negotiations with the Commission on EC
entry." Brian Love, Alarm Sounded on EC Bans on Seal Fur, Whale Meat,
Ivory, Reuter Library Report, Dec. 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Allnws File.
223. At this point, the majority of the Norwegian cabinet still favors EC
membership for Norway. Stella Bugge, Norway Offers Little in Fisheries Talks,
Reuter European Community Report, Nov. 12, 1993, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Allnws File. The opinion of the Norwegian public, however, might
cause Norway to voluntarily forego EC membership rather than renounce whal-
ing. "Opinion polls show that a wide majority of Norwegians oppose member-
ship, partly due to worries about losing national control over resources such as
fish.. ." Id.
224. See supra note 91.
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tivated partly by extenuating circumstances, 225 and he is un-
likely to show as much leniency when the issue comes up again.
Furthermore, even if Norway successfully challenges the GATT
consistency of U.S. sanctions, the victory is likely to be a hollow
one, just as it was for Mexico in Tuna/Dolphin.226 Although the
GATT panel found that U.S. trade sanctions violated GATT
rules, Mexico, in response to U.S. pressure, refrained from
bringing the panel's report before the GATT Council.227 As a
result, the report never became binding on the United States,
and Mexico eventually ceased its objectionable tuna fishing
practices. 228 A panel report condemning U.S. sanctions against
Norway would probably be similarly ineffective. 229
It is inevitable that all the pressure on Norway will eventu-
ally take its toll. As environmentalists quite accurately point
out, "[t]he public has continually exhibited a deep concern for
the plight of whales and will not tolerate renewed commercial
whaling."230 Although Norway has science on it side, 23 ' Norwe-
gian officials will eventually realize that all the science in the
world is not going to change the public's opinion of whaling.
Whales have occupied a special place in human culture for
hundreds of years232 and continue to do so today. 233 As Norway
continues whaling, the vast weight of public opinion will eventu-
ally have a serious effect on its economic well-being, as well as
its foreign relations. When that effect becomes too pronounced,
despite all of Norway's claims to the contrary,234 Norwegian offi-
cials will likely decide that the benefits of their limited whaling
industry simply do not justify the costs. At that point,
225. The President's leniency is said to have been partially motivated by
Norway's recent mediation of the talks between Israel and the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization. Clinton Delays Norway Sanctions, supra note 91.
226. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
227. Schoenbaum, supra note 9, at 703 n.13.
228. See supra note 61.
229. U.S. public opinion strongly opposes whaling. See infra notes 232-33
and accompanying text. Consequently, the United States is not likely to show
any more deference to Norway than it did to Mexico.
230. COMMERCIAL WHAIING INFORMATION Krr, supra note 3.
231. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
232. Literary works concerning whales have been common for over a cen-
tury, beginning, of course, with Herman Melville's Moby Dick, published in
1851. Whales are also becoming popular subjects for musicians and artists.
Kalland, supra note 132, at 8.
233. The dramatic growth of the whale-watching industry is a good indica-
tion of just how popular whales have become. So-called "whale safaris" are con-
ducted all over the world and, in recent years, have developed into a $350
million a year business. COMMERCIAL WHALING INFORMATION Krr, supra note 3.
234. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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thousands of years of Norwegian whaling will finally draw to an
inglorious close.
VI. CONCLUSION
Whether the United States should take unilateral measures
to enforce international environmental rules is an important
component of the general debate concerning free trade and envi-
ronmental protection. Unilateral measures have had a signifi-
cant impact on world trade in the past,235 and undoubtedly will
continue to do so in the future.236 Although there is broad inter-
national support for a global ban on whaling, the threat of uni-
lateral U.S. sanctions is a major catalyst sparking the debate
over Norwegian whaling practices.
As a general matter, unilateral trade restrictions imposed
in the name of environmental protection are inappropriate and
should be avoided, 237 particularly when they are inconsistent
with GATT. This principle applies with special force in the pres-
ent context because the weight of scientific evidence is against
those who oppose limited commercial whaling. Opponents of
Norwegian whaling are thus reduced to making arguments
based on emotion and sentimentality. If unilateral sanctions are
allowed to stand on such a weak foundation, the stage would be
set for a rapid deterioration of world trade, precipitated by a
flood of unilateral trade restrictions. Thus, a U.S. embargo im-
posed against Norway pursuant to the Pelly Amendment would
be a potentially dangerous and highly inappropriate response to
Norway's recent resumption of commercial whaling.
235. For example, the EC ban on seal fur "is widely seen as having led to the
collapse in the mid-1980s of a controversial Canadian seal hunt which killed
close to 200,000 baby seals a year for their fur." Love, supra note 222.
236. In addition to the threat of unilateral sanctions imposed by the United
States, individual member states of the European Community are also author-
ized to "take any action they [want] ... regarding punitive measures against
Norway", according to an EC spokesman. Norway to Ask for U.S. Agreement on
Whaling, European Report, Oct. 9, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Allnws File.
237. The international community agrees that, as a general matter,
"[ulnilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges outside the jurisdic-
tion of the importing country should be avoided." Rio Declaration on Environ-
ment and Development, U.N. Conference on Environment and Development,
Principle 12, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1 (1992). As noted earlier, Pelly
Amendment sanctions would not be completely unilateral since they would be
partially founded on the rules of the IWC. See supra notes 185-86 and accompa-
nying text. However, the fact that most IWC members favor a global morato-
rium on whaling does not necessarily mean that they would also favor
unilateral U.S. action to enforce that moratorium.
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